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MAJORITARIANISM REINTERPRETED: 
EFFECTIVE REPRESENTATION AND THE QUALITY OF WESTMINSTER DEMOCRACY 
 
 
Abstract 
 
Comparative analyses have frequently cast the United Kingdom as a paradigm of majoritarianism, 
wherein a power-hoarding executive dominates parliament and policymaking. Yet, this article 
contends that existing studies have paid insufficient attention to the opportunities for opposition 
parties to affect policymaking via the legislative arena; and applies a refined version of WŽǁĞůů ?Ɛ
index of effective representation to map the institutional conditions that structure policy payoffs.  
This analysis demonstrates that reforms to shift the balance between government and parliament 
have served to offset the declining vote basis of government, and have in turn ensured that 
Westminster remains effectively responsive to a majority of the electorate.   
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Comparative analyses have frequently cast the United Kingdom (UK) as a paradigm of 
majoritarianism, in which a power-hoarding executive dominates parliament and the wider policy 
process (e.g. Lijphart, 2012; Powell, 2000).  In turn, the House of Commons is often portrayed as an 
ŝŶĞĨĨĞĐƚŝǀĞ  ‘ĂƌĞŶĂ ?  ?WŽůƐďǇ ?  ? ? ? ? )which lacks the clout of its continental counterparts (e.g. Strøm, 
1990; Mattson and Strøm, 1995; Siaroff, 2003); and it is ĂƌŐƵĞĚƚŚĂƚtĞƐƚŵŝŶƐƚĞƌŝƐ ‘ĂƐƚĂŶĚŽƵƚĐĂƐĞ
ŽĨŶĞŐĂƚŝǀĞƌĂƚŚĞƌƚŚĂŶĐŽŶƐƚƌƵĐƚŝǀĞŽƉƉŽƐŝƚŝŽŶĂůƉŽůŝƚŝĐƐ ? ?ŶĚĞǁĞŐ ? ? ? ? ? ?Ɖ ? ? ? ) ?Normatively, the 
exclusion of non-government actors from policymaking is justified in terms strong and responsible 
government, with elections equipping the largest party with the necessary legislative majority to 
enact its policy platform unencumbered; and there is a tactic acceptance of the governing legitimacy 
of plurality winners. In recent years, however, the vote basis of government has dwindled to such an 
extent that it is argued that the majority of the electorate is  ‘ƵƚƚĞƌůǇƵŶƌĞƉƌĞƐĞŶƚĞĚ ? ?^ŚƵŐĂƌƚ ? ? ? ? ? ?
p. 175) as governments pursue  ‘ƉŽůŝĐŝĞƐƐƵƉƉŽƌƚĞĚďǇŽŶůǇĂƐŵĂůůŶƵŵďĞƌŽĨǀŽƚĞƌƐ ? EĂŐĞů ? ? ? ? ? ?Ɖ ?
118).  Indeed, the weakening of the electoral connection between voters and government has been 
ĐŚĂƌŐĞĚǁŝƚŚ ‘ƵŶĚĞƌŵŝŶ ?ŝŶŐ ?ƚŚĞǀĞƌǇĨŽƵŶƚŽĨŐŽǀĞƌŶŵĞŶƚĂƵƚŚŽƌŝƚǇ ? ?ƌŝƐŬŝŶŐĂ ‘ĂƐĞůĨ-generated and 
self-ƉĞƌƉĞƚƵĂƚŝŶŐůĞŐŝƚŝŵĂƚŝŽŶĐƌŝƐŝƐ ? ?:ƵĚŐĞ ? ? ? ? ? ?ƉƉ ? ? ? ?-700).   
 
 
On the face of it, this does not augur well for tĞƐƚŵŝŶƐƚĞƌ ?ƐĚĞŵŽĐƌĂƚŝĐĐƌĞĚentials. Nonetheless, 
this article contends that the extent to which Westminster promotes unrepresentative and 
unresponsive government is often overstated, which stems from two inter-connected oversights.  
Firstly, by focusing on the dispersal of the spoils of office, many existing studies have paid 
insufficient attention to the opportunities for opposition parties to extract policy payoffs via the 
legislative arena (e.g. Lijphart, 2012).  Secondly, studies that have examined the institutional 
conditions structuring policy payoffs have generally focused on the exercise of legislative scrutiny, 
which neglects the many other activities that legislatures may undertake (e.g. Powell, 2000; Strøm, 
1990; Mattson and Strøm, 1995; Siaroff, 2003).  A reappraisal of Westminster democracy is 
therefore required in order to account for the different payoffs enjoyed by parties, and the extent to 
which these serve to connect the supporters of government and non-government parties with the 
policy process.   
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To address these interconnected analytical and empirical blind spots, this article draws upon the 
index of effective representation developed by Powell (2000).  In contrast to  ‘ƐƚĂƚŝĐĐŽŶĐĞƉƚƐ ?ƚŚĂƚ
ůŽŽŬ Ăƚ  ‘ǀŽƚĞ ĂŶĚ ƐĞĂƚƐ ĂůŽŶĞ ?  ?ůĂƵ ?  ? ? ? ? ? Ɖ ?  ? ? ? ) ? ƚŚŝƐ ŝŶĚĞǆ systematically identifies the 
institutional opportunities that exist for government and non-government parliamentarians to affect 
policymaking.  Yet, ǁŚĞƌĞĂƐ WŽǁĞůů ?Ɛ ŝndex focuses on the ability of the legislature to amend or 
propose legislation, this article adopts a broader understanding of legislative capacity and develops a 
series of alternative measures to provide a more nuanced analysis of the institutional conditions in 
which parliamentarians operate, in particular via its committees.  Applied to Westminster, this 
refined index demonstrates that reforms to  ‘ƐŚŝĨƚƚŚĞďĂůĂŶĐĞ ?between government and parliament 
(HC 300, 2000) have significantly expanded the opportunities for opposition influence within the 
legislature, which together have offset the declining vote basis of government to ensure that 
Westminster remains responsive to a majority of the electorate.  Nonetheless, whilst tempering the 
assumption that the allocation of electoral spoils is zero-sum and exclusionary, these findings 
suggest that both office and policy payoffs remain disproportionately dispersed, and that a 
significant minority of voters continue to lack an authorised connection with policymaking.  In the 
context of democratic disengagement this disconnect clearly matters, and this analysis underlines 
the potential of electoral reform and institutional reform to enhance both the proportionality and 
quality of democratic representation.   
 
 
Through its analysis, the article makes a number of important contributions.  Theoretically, it offers a 
ĐŽƵŶƚĞƌƉŽŝŶƚƚŽƚŚĞ ‘ƉĂƌůŝĂŵĞŶƚĂƌǇĚĞĐůŝŶĞƚŚĞƐŝƐ ? ?ƐĞĞ&ůŝŶĚĞƌƐĂŶĚ<ĞůƐŽ ? ? ? ? ? )ĂŶĚƚŽĐŽŵƉĂƌĂƚŝǀĞ
studies that portray Westminster politics as inherently adversarial and elite (including Powell, 2000).  
Methodologically, it illuminates a number of understudied connections in the chain of delegation 
from voters to policymakers, whilst developing a series of measures that enable a more nuanced 
analysis of the capacity of legislative committees. Empirically, it provides critical insights regarding 
the quality of Westminster democracy and the challenges to which it remains subject.  To develop 
these arguments, the article proceeds as follows.  It commences with an overview of the existing 
literature, contrasting the accounts of negative adversarialism that have predominated comparative 
studies with evidence of a more nuanced relationship between government and parliament.  
&ŽůůŽǁŝŶŐŽŶ ĨƌŽŵƚŚŝƐ ? ƚŚĞĂƌƚŝĐůĞĞǆƉůŽƌĞƐWŽǁĞůů ?Ɛindex of effective representation, and set out 
several important modifications to enhance its analytical purchase.  This is then applied to the UK to 
determine the extent to which voters are connected with the policy process.  The article concludes 
by locating these findings within a series of methodological debates regarding the challenges of 
capturing voter preferences, and normative debates regarding the relationship between institutional 
structures and democratic satisfaction. 
 
 
1.  Westminster majoritarianism and the uneven dispersal of electoral spoils 
Within the comparative literature a broad distinction is often drawn between parliamentary systems 
predicated upon the principles of strong and accountable government, and those that privilege 
inclusion and consensus.  Lijphart, for example, distinguishes between  ‘ŵĂũŽƌŝƚĂƌŝĂŶ ?ĂŶĚ ‘ĐŽŶƐĞŶƐƵƐ ?
democracies; associating the former with ƚŚĞ  ‘ĐŽŶĐĞŶƚƌĂƚ ?ŝŽŶ ?ŽĨƉŽůŝƚŝĐĂůƉŽǁĞƌ ŝŶ ƚŚĞŚĂŶĚƐŽĨĂ
ďĂƌĞŵĂũŽƌŝƚǇ ?ĂŶĚƚŚĞůĂƚƚĞƌǁŝƚŚ ‘ďƌŽĂĚƉĂƌƚŝĐŝƉĂƚŝŽŶŝŶŐŽǀĞƌŶŵĞŶƚĂŶĚďƌŽĂĚĂŐƌĞĞŵĞŶƚŽŶƚŚĞ
policies that the government should purƐƵĞ ?(2012, p. 2).  In a similar vein, Powell contrasts 
ŵĂũŽƌŝƚĂƌŝĂŶ ĂŶĚ ƉƌŽƉŽƌƚŝŽŶĂů  ‘ǀŝƐŝŽŶƐ ? ŝŶ ĂĐĐŽƌĚĂŶĐĞ ǁŝƚŚƚŚĞ  ‘ƌĞƉƌĞƐĞŶƚĂƚŝŽŶĂů ĐŽŶŐƌƵĞŶĐĞ
ďĞƚǁĞĞŶ ƉŽůŝĐǇŵĂŬĞƌƐ ? ƉŽƐŝƚŝŽŶƐ ĂŶĚ ĐŝƚŝǌĞŶƐ ? ƉƌĞĨĞƌĞŶĐĞƐ ?  ? ? ? ? ?, pp. 4-17).  Elsewhere, Siaroff 
compares ƚŚĞ ‘ƉŽůĂƌŽƉƉŽƐŝƚĞƚǇƉĞƐ ?ŽĨ ‘ĐĂďŝŶĞƚĚŽŵŝŶĂŶĐĞ ?ĂŶĚ ‘ĐŽŽƉĞƌĂƚŝǀĞƉŽůŝĐǇ-making diffusion 
ǁŝƚŚĂǁŽƌŬŝŶŐƉĂƌůŝĂŵĞŶƚ ?  ? ? ? ? ? ?Ɖ ?  ? ? ? ) ?Such contrasts are underscored by the different points 
along the  ‘chain of delegation ? (Strøm, 2000) at which legislative majorities are formed.  
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Majoritarianism casts elections as the  ‘decisive stage ?, with electoral rules being purposively 
designed to reward the winning party with an outright majority of seats and few barriers to the 
implementation of its agenda.  The consensus or proportional vision, in contrast, focuses on the 
post-election negotiation of multi-party coalitions, and the accommodative bargaining that occurs 
throughout the policy process.  A  ‘ƚƌĂĚĞ-ŽĨĨ ? Žƌ  ‘ƚĞŶƐŝŽŶ ?is therefore envisaged between 
 ‘ĐŽŶĐĞŶƚƌĂƚĞĚ ĂŶĚ Ěispersed power for policymaking and the desirĂďůĞ ĐŽŶƐĞƋƵĞŶĐĞƐ ŽĨ ĞĂĐŚ ? 
(Powell, 2000, p. 19). 
 
The UK ?ƐƉŽƌƚƌĂǇĂů as the prototypical power-hoarding polity is so widely accepted that the terms 
 ‘Westminster model ? and  ‘majoritarianism ? are frequently ƵƐĞĚ ‘ŝŶƚĞƌĐŚĂŶŐĞĂďůǇ ? ?>ŝũƉŚĂƌƚ ? ? ? ? ? ?Ɖ ?
9).  FĂŵŽƵƐůǇ ĚĞƐĐƌŝďĞĚ ďǇ <ŝŶŐ ĂƐ ƌĞƐĞŵďůŝŶŐ Ă  ‘ǁĂƌ ŐĂŵĞ ? ǁŚĞƌĞ  ‘ďŽƚŚ ƐŝĚĞƐ ƉůĂǇ ƚŽǁŝŶ ?  ?<ŝŶŐ ?
1976, p. 18), Westminster ?Ɛ ŝŶƐƚŝƚƵƚŝŽŶĂů ƐƚƌƵĐƚƵƌĞƐ are intended to equip an election ?Ɛ  ‘ǁŝŶŶĞƌƐ ?
with a clear parliamentary majority and to exclude entirely its  ‘ůŽƐĞƌƐ ? from policymaking.  
Normatively, this exclusive approach to policymaking reflects the priority accorded to decisiveness 
of action and clarity of responsibility, which in turn justifies the production of  ‘manufactured 
majorities ?  ?ZĂĞ ?  ? ? ? ? ) as a means of ensuring government responsiveness. Yet whilst there is a 
pragmatic acceptance of the governing legitimacy of  ‘ƉůƵƌĂůŝƚǇ ? Žƌ  ‘ŶĞĂƌ ŵĂũŽƌŝƚǇ ?winners (see 
Powell, 2000, pp. 77-81), the credibility of this compromise has been challenged by the steady 
decline in the support enjoyed by governments.  In 2005, for example, the vote basis of government 
reached a record low as a Labour legislative majority was endorsed by a mere 35.2% of voters; and 
in 2015 the share of vote accorded to the two main parties plunged to 67.3%.  Moreover, whilst the 
2010-15 Coalition enjoyed a majority share of the popular vote (59.1%), the extent to which this 
constitutes a popular mandate remains moot, as the coalition that did emerge had not been 
presented to the electorate as a potential government during the election campaign.  It should be 
noted that eǀĞŶĚƵƌŝŶŐƚŚĞ ‘ŐŽůĚĞŶĂŐĞ ?ŽĨƚǁŽ-party competition of the post-war period, no party 
was supported by a majority, which last occurred in 1931 when the Conservatives under Stanley 
Baldwin won the general election with a 55% share of the popular vote.  Moreover, the UK ?Ɛ
experience is far from unusual, as comparative research suggests that single parties or pre-identified 
coalitions have won a majority of votes in only a fraction of elections (Powell, 2000, p. 80).  
Nonetheless, the breakdown of the classic model of two-party competition has prompted scepticism 
regarding the capacity of majoritarian systems to produce strong governments that are truly 
accountable to a majority of voters (e.g. Dunleavy and Margetts, 2001; Kaiser et al, 2002; Dunleavy 
2005; Lundell, 2011); and it has been suggested that Westminster democracies instead constitute a 
 ‘ƐƵď-ŵĂũŽƌŝƚĂƌŝĂŶ ƐƉŚĞƌĞ ŽĨ ƉůƵƌĂůŝƚĂƌŝĂŶ ƐǇƐƚĞŵƐ ? ? ǁŚĞƌĞŝŶ ŐŽǀĞƌŶŵĞŶƚƐ  ‘enact policies supported 
ďǇŽŶůǇĂƐŵĂůůŶƵŵďĞƌŽĨǀŽƚĞƌƐ ? ?EĂŐĞů ? ? ? ? ? ?Ɖ ? ? ? ? ) ? 
 
Table 1 below demonstrates the extent to which the normative ideal of majority government has 
been compromised, which is rendered starker in the context of declining turnout.  It is clear that the 
ŐŽǀĞƌŶŵĞŶƚ ?Ɛ ĚĞĐůŝŶŝŶŐ ǀŽƚĞ ďĂƐŝƐ ŝƐ ŝŶĞǆŽƌĂďůǇbound up with changing patterns of voting 
behaviour.  In theory, tĞƐƚŵŝŶƐƚĞƌ ?ƐĞůĞĐƚŽƌĂůƌƵůĞƐshould encourage two-party competition, with 
spatial theories of party competition anticipating that these parties will coalesce around the centre 
in order to maximise votes and acquire office (e.g. Downs, 1957; Rae, 1967; Cox, 1997).  Yet recent 
elections have witnessed increasingly multi-party competition on the ground, as the weakening of 
traditional electoral cleavages and the rise in issue-based voting have increased the vote of the 
 ‘ƚŚŝƌĚ ?ƉĂƌƚǇ ?ŝ ?Ğ ?ƚŚĞ>ŝďĞƌĂůĞŵŽĐƌĂƚƐ )and allowed new parties such as the Green Party and the UK 
Independence Party (UKIP) to rise in prominence.  Indeed, Dunleavy has argued the increasing multi-
level ĐŚĂƌĂĐƚĞƌŽĨƚŚĞh< ?ƐĞůĞĐƚŽƌĂůŐĞŽŐƌĂƉŚǇŚĂƐƌĞƐƵůƚĞĚŝŶ ‘at least five or six distinct positions 
involved in party politics and citizens in every part of the UK now seem to have complex and 
 4 
ĂƌƚŝĐƵůĂƚĞĚƉƌĞĨĞƌĞŶĐĞƐƚƌƵĐƚƵƌĞƐĂĐƌŽƐƐƉĂƌƚŝĞƐ ? ?ƵŶůĞĂǀǇ ? ? ? ? ? ?Ɖ ? ? ? ? ) ? An application of Laakso 
ĂŶĚ dĂĂŐƉĞƌĂ ?Ɛ  ? ? ? ? ? ) ŝŶĚĞǆ ŽĨ ƚŚĞ ĞĨĨĞĐƚŝǀĞ ŶƵŵďĞƌ ŽĨ ƉĂƌƚŝĞƐ underscores this change, 
demonstrating a clear increase in the effective number of electoral parties, which peaked in 2015 at 
3.87.  
 
Although a two-party model of party competition ĂƉƉĞĂƌƐ ƚŽ ŚĂǀĞ  ‘receded into history beyond 
ƌĞĐĂůů ? ?ƵŶůĞĂǀǇ ? ? ? ? ? ?Ɖ ? ? ? ? ) ? the combination of the diffuse support for many smaller parties and 
the high threshold to entry imposed by single-member districts (see Cox, 1997) has limited the 
impact of this competition upon the overall distribution of seats at Westminster.  This was vividly 
illustrated by the 2015 general election, which saw UKIP emerge as the third most popular party, but 
receive just one MP for its 12.7% share of the vote.  In contrast, despite receiving only 4.7% of the 
vote nationwide, the geographically concentrated strength of the Scottish National Party saw the 
party being returned as the third largest party in the House with 56 seats.  As such there is a 
widening gap between the effective number of electoral parties and parliamentary parties (see Blau, 
2008) ?ĂŶĚĂŶĂƉƉůŝĐĂƚŝŽŶŽĨ'ĂůůĂŐŚĞƌ ?Ɛ  ? ? ? ? ? ) ŝŶĚĞǆŽĨĚŝƐƉƌŽƉŽƌƚŝŽŶĂůŝƚǇĨƵƌƚŚĞƌ underscores the 
loosening of the relationship between votes cast and seats won.  Indeed, the burgeoning gap 
between votes and seats has weakened the vote basis of Parliament itself, and table 1 shows that 
ƐŝŶĐĞ ? ? ? ?ƚŚĞƌĞŚĂƐďĞĞŶĂƌĞƉƌĞƐĞŶƚĂƚŝŽŶ ‘ŐĂƉ ?Ăǀeraging 19.4%, which reached a record high of 
23.8% in 2015.  Reflecting on such evidence, Quinn has suggested that party competition in the UK 
ŶŽǁŽĐĐƵƉŝĞƐĂŶĞǁĐĂƚĞŐŽƌǇŽĨ ‘ĂůƚĞƌŶĂƚŝŶŐƉƌĞĚŽŵŝŶĂŶĐĞ ? ?ǁŚŝĐŚƌĞĨůĞĐƚƐƚŚĞ ‘multi-partism in the 
electoral arena and uncompetitive two-ƉĂƌƚŝƐŵŝŶƚŚĞƉĂƌůŝĂŵĞŶƚĂƌǇĂƌĞŶĂ ? ?Quinn, 2012, p. 399).  
 
***table 1 here*** 
 
The cumulative effect of the interplay tĞƐƚŵŝŶƐƚĞƌ ?ƐĞůĞĐƚŽƌĂůƌƵůĞƐand changing patterns of party 
competition has meant that in the vast majority of instances, a single party has been fully rewarded 
with the spoils of government office despite a waning plurality of electoral support.  This is made 
clear in table 1, which shows the significant disconnect between the effective number of electoral 
(and parliamentary) parties and effective number of cabinet parties.  In focusing on the 
ƉƌŽƉŽƌƚŝŽŶĂůŝƚǇ ŽĨ ŐŽǀĞƌŶŵĞŶƚ ?Ɛ ǀŽƚĞ ďĂƐŝƐ and its relationship to the distribution of seats in the 
House, much existing scholarship has implicitly focused on the dispersal of office payoffs (for a 
notable exception see Blau, 2008).  In turn, the interaction between the two branches of 
Westminster has often been portrayed in entirely adversarial terms, with Parliament being cast as 
ĂŶŝŶĞĨĨĞĐƚŝǀĞ ‘ĂƌĞŶĂ ? ?WŽůƐďǇ ? ? ? ? ?) that is  ‘ĞŝƚŚĞƌƉĞƌŝƉŚĞƌĂůŽƌƚŽƚĂůůǇŝƌƌĞůĞǀĂŶƚ ? ?<ŝŶŐĂŶĚƌĞǁĞ ?
2013, p. 361).  However ? ĂƐ &ůŝŶĚĞƌƐ ĂŶĚ <ĞůƐŽ ĂƌŐƵĞ ?  ‘the dominant public, media and academic 
perception of an eviscerated and sidelined parliament provides a misleading caricature of a more 
ĐŽŵƉůĞǆ ŝŶƐƚŝƚƵƚŝŽŶ ?  ? ? ? ? ? ?Ɖ ?  ? ? ? ) ?ĂŶĚĂŶƵŵďĞƌŽĨ recent studies have challenged the image of 
parliamentarians as little more than subservient lobby fodder.   
 
Within the House of Commons, the increased rate of parliamentary rebellions has been cited as 
evidence of the loosening bonds of party discipline (e.g. Cowley, 2005).  Indeed, research reveals 
that the 2010-15 parliament was the most rebellious since 1945 as 52% of Conservative MPs and 
72% of Liberal Democrat MPs voted against the Coalition at least once (Cowley and Stuart, 2014).  In 
any vote rebels generally constitute a small minority, and it remains relatively rare for governments 
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to suffer defeats in the Commons.  Nonetheless, it is argued that simply focus on defeats  ‘ĚŝƐĐŽƵŶƚƐ
ƚŚĞ ŝŵƉĂĐƚ ŽĨ ŶĞǁ ůĞǀĞůƐ ŽĨ ƌĞďĞůůŝŽƵƐŶĞƐƐ ŽŶ ƉĂƌůŝĂŵĞŶƚĂƌǇ ĂŶƚŝĐŝƉĂƚĞĚ ƌĞĂĐƚŝŽŶƐ ? ƌĞŶĚĞƌŝŶŐ  ‘ƚŚĞ
ŝŵƉĂĐƚŽĨƌĞƚƌĞĂƚƐ ?ĂƐ ?ƐŝŐŶŝĨŝĐĂŶƚůǇŐƌĞĂƚĞƌƚŚĂŶƚŚĞŝŵƉĂĐƚŽĨĚĞĨĞĂƚƐ ? ?ZƵƐƐĞůůĂŶĚŽǁůĞǇ ? ? ? ? ? ?Ɖ ?
125). A similar pattern of activism has been observed in the House of Lords; and it has been argued 
that the House of Lords Act 1999 delivĞƌĞĚ ‘ĂƌĞǀŝǀĂůŽĨďŝĐĂŵĞƌĂůŝƐŵ ? ?Russell, 2013, p. 293) where 
no single party dominates, and where votes are increasingly issue-based and closely fought.  The 
Coalition, for example, suffered significant defeats on many of its key (and most controversial) 
policies, including the Welfare Reform Bill (2012), the Health and Social Care Bill (2012), and the 
Banking Reform Bill (2013).  Similarly, the current Government been frustrated by the Lords in 
relation to contentious bills such as the Welfare Reform and Work Bill (2015), the Immigration Bill 
(2016), and the Higher Education and Research Bill (2017).  
 
Other studies have focused on select committees, challenging their portrayal as toothless entities 
(c.f. Strøm, 1990; Mattson and Strøm, 1995) by drawing attention to their direct impact and indirect 
influence upon government and its legislation.  Focusing on the Education and Skills Select 
Committee, Hindmoor et al (2009) demonstrate that whilst only a small number of its 
recommendations were subsequently incorporated into government bills, the Committee enjoyed 
indirect influence at many intervals upon a number of actors (government, parliament, the media, 
political parties).  Elsewhere, Benton and Russell (2013) trace the recommendations of 216 select 
committee reports to reveal eight distinct forms of influence over government policy: direct 
acceptance of committee recommendations; influencing policy debate; spotlighting issues; 
brokering policy disputes; providing expert evidence; holding government to account; exposure; 
and, generating fear (Benton and Russell, 2013, pp. 778-9).  In a similar vein, Thompson has sought 
ƚŽ  ‘ĚĞďƵŶŬ ? ƚŚĞ  ‘ŵǇƚŚƐ ?that surround the operation of House of Commons bill committees 
(Thompson, 2015), such as their supposed lack of expertise and impact. Her detailed analysis of the 
proceedings of 139 bill committees demonstrates that whilst  ‘ĨŽƌŵĂů ĐŚĂŶŐĞƐ ƚŽ ďŝůůƐ ǁŝƚŚŝŶ ƚŚĞ
ĐŽŶĨŝŶĞƐ ŽĨ ƚŚĞ ĐŽŵŵŝƚƚĞĞ ƌŽŽŵ ĂƌĞ ƌĂƌĞ ? ? Ă ƐŝŐŶŝĨŝĐĂŶƚ ŶƵŵďĞƌ ŽĨ ĐŚĂŶŐĞƐ ƚŽ ůĞŐŝƐůĂƚŝŽŶ ĐĂŶ
ultimately be traced to amendments initially proposed at committee stage (Thompson, 2015, p. 10).  
More broadly, she argues that ďŝůů ĐŽŵŵŝƚƚĞĞƐ ĂƌĞ  ‘ŵŽƌĞ ƚŚĂŶ ƐŝŵƉůǇ ƚŚĞ ƐĐƌƵƚŝŶŝƐĞƌƐ ŽĨ ďŝůůƐ ? ?
ƉƌŽǀŝĚŝŶŐ  ‘backbench and frontbench MPs alike with a valuable opportunity to debate with 
government ministers and with members of opposing parties in a ŵƵĐŚŵŽƌĞŝŶƚŝŵĂƚĞĞŶǀŝƌŽŶŵĞŶƚ ?
(Thompson, 2015, p. 9). 
 
Taken together, such scholarship reveals that Parliament matters: that on the floor of the House and 
along the corridors of committee rooms, non-government parliamentarians have at their disposal a 
range of means through which they can affect the outcomes of the legislative process.  This is vividly 
illustrated by Russell and Cowley ?Ɛ analysis of over 6,000 parliamentary votes and 4,000 legislative 
amendments, which demonstrated the extent to which backbench and opposition parliamentarians 
exercise  ‘ǀŝƐŝďůĞŝŶĨůƵĞŶĐĞŽŶƚŚĞƌĞĐŽƌĚĂŶĚƚŚĂƚŽĐĐƵƌƌŝŶŐďĞŚŝŶĚƚŚĞƐĐĞŶĞƐ ? ?ZƵƐƐĞůůĂŶĚŽǁůĞǇ ?
2016, p. 123).  In particular, their study underlines Parliament ?Ɛ  ‘ƉƌĞǀĞŶƚĂƚŝǀĞ ŝŶĨůƵĞŶĐĞ ? ? ǁŚŝĐŚ
encourages governments to focus on  ‘anticipated reactions ?:  
Governments take constant account of parliamentary opinion, and in normal circumstances, do 
not put proposals to parliament that it will not accept.  Commons defeats are rare and generally a 
sign that party managers have misjudged the situation (Russell and Cowley, 2016, p. 133).    
It is therefore clear that equating responsiveness with office-holding neglects the alternative means 
through which non-government parliamentarians can achieve policy goals.  As Strøm argues, 
 ‘ŐŽǀĞƌŶŵĞŶƚƉĂƌƚŝĐŝƉĂƚŝŽŶ ŝƐŶŽƚĂŶĞĐĞƐƐĂƌǇĐŽŶĚŝƚŝŽŶ ĨŽƌƉĂǇŽĨĨ Q  ?ĂƐ ?ŽƉƉŽƐŝƚŝŽŶƉĂƌƚŝĞƐŵĂǇďĞ
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able to exert deliberative policy influence, particularly through ĞĨĨŽƌƚƐ ŝŶ ƚŚĞ ůĞŐŝƐůĂƚŝǀĞ ĂƌĞŶĂ ?
(Strøm, 1990, pp. 38-41).  zĞƚďǇĨŽĐƵƐŝŶŐŽŶƚŚĞ ‘ƌĞƐƉŽŶƐŝďůĞƉĂƌƚǇ ?ŽĨŐŽǀĞƌŶŵĞŶƚ ?ƚŚĞ ‘notion that 
parties might fulfil representative functions while iŶŽƉƉŽƐŝƚŝŽŶŝƐůĂƌŐĞůǇŝŐŶŽƌĞĚ ? ?ƌĂŶĚĞŶďƵƌŐĂŶĚ
Johns, 2013).  As such, a more comprehensive analysis is required to capture the extent to which 
supporters of government and non-government parties alike are represented in policymaking. It is to 
this task that the next section turns. 
 
2. Measuring the institutional conditions that structure policy payoffs 
In contrast to the wealth of literature devoted to capturing the congruency between votes and 
seats, there have been few attempts to systematically analyse the institutional opportunities for all 
representatives to affect policy. One notable exception is Powell (2000), whose analytical framework 
moves beyond a simple focus on the numerical distribution of seats in the legislature to instead 
direct attention to the institutional resources enjoyed by different groups of legislative actors.  At 
the heart of this framework is a ĚŝƐƚŝŶĐƚŝŽŶ ďĞƚǁĞĞŶ  ‘ƉƌŽƉŽƌƚŝŽŶĂů ? ĂŶĚ  ‘ĞĨĨĞĐƚŝǀĞ ?representation, 
which dovetails with the distinction between office payoffs and policy payoffs discussed above.  
Whereas  ‘proportional representation ? focuses on the extent to which the distribution of cabinet 
portfolios among governing parties is in proportion to their ƐĞĂƚƐ ŝŶ ƚŚĞ ůĞŐŝƐůĂƚƵƌĞ ?  ‘ĞĨĨĞĐƚŝǀĞ
ƌĞƉƌĞƐĞŶƚĂƚŝŽŶ ? ĨŽĐƵƐĞƐ ŽŶ  ‘ƚŚĞ ĞǆƚĞŶƚ ƚŽ ǁŚŝĐŚ ƚŚĞ ŽƉƉŽƐŝƚŝŽŶ ŝƐ effectively represented in 
ƉŽůŝĐǇŵĂŬŝŶŐ ? (Powell, 2000, p. 100).  Building on this, Powell develops an index of effective 
representation to capture the extent to which the supporters of government and non-government 
parties alike are connected with the policy process. 
 
To determine the degree of connection, the index of effective representation applies a series of 
scores to qualify the electoral support of a party relative to its likely influence, as detailed in table 2 
below.  The index assumes that the supporters of government parties have a guaranteed connection 
with policymaking, and applies a score of 1.0 to ƚŚĞƐĞƉĂƌƚŝĞƐ ?share of the vote.  In contrast, the 
index assumes that the degree of connection for the supporters of non-government parties depends 
upon the  ‘ŽƉƉŽƌƚƵŶŝƚŝĞƐĨŽƌŽƉƉŽƐŝƚŝŽŶŝŶĨůƵĞŶĐĞ ?ƚŚĂƚĞǆŝƐƚǁŝƚŚŝŶƚŚĞůĞŐŝƐůĂƚƵƌĞ.  This is comprised 
of two aspects.  &ŝƌƐƚůǇ ?ƚŚĞŝŶĚĞǆĨŽĐƵƐĞƐŽŶ ‘ŽƉƉŽƌƚƵŶŝƚŝĞƐĨŽƌďĂƌŐĂŝŶŝŶŐǁŝƚŚŐŽǀĞƌŶŵĞŶƚ ? within 
the plenary, and qualifies the support received by non-government parties relative to their 
relationship the executive.  Any party recognised as officially supporting the government receives a 
score  ? ? ? ? ?ǁŚŝĐŚƌĞĨůĞĐƚƐƚŚĞŝƌ  ‘ƉƌŽďĂďŝůŝƚǇŽĨŚĂǀŝŶŐ ŝŶĨůƵĞ ĐĞŐƌĞĂƚĞƌ ƚŚĂŶŽĨƉĂƌƚŝĞƐŽƵƚƐŝĚĞƚŚĞ
goveƌŶŵĞŶƚ ? ?WŽǁĞůů ? ? ? ? ? ?Ɖ ? ? ? ? ) ?Parties wholly outside government receive the following scores: 
0.1  W opposition facing majority government; 0.2  W opposition facing supported minority 
government; 0.5  W opposition facing minority government. Secondly, the index focuses on the 
opportunities for influence provided by  ‘legislative committee ƐƚƌƵĐƚƵƌĞƐ ?, and assigns the following 
scores: 0.25  W strong committees with chairs equally shared amongst all large parties; and, 0.125  W 
either strong committees chaired by government parties or weak committees with shared chairs.  
Taking these two aspects together, the  ‘ƉƌŽďĂďůĞŝŶĨůƵĞŶĐĞ ?ŽĨan opposition party therefore ranges 
from a theoretical 0.1 (opposition parties facing majority government and the absence of legislative 
committees) to 0.75 (opposition parties facing minority government and the presence of strong 
legislative committees) (Powell, 2000, pp. 103-9).  Once the appropriate score has been applied to 
each party ?s share of the vote, the qualified support for all government and non-government parties 
can then be ĂŐŐƌĞŐĂƚĞĚƚŽĚĞƚĞƌŵŝŶĞƚŚĞ ‘ƚŽƚĂůĐŽŶĚŝƚŝŽŶƐĨŽƌĞĨĨĞĐƚŝǀĞƌĞƉƌĞƐĞŶƚĂƚŝŽŶ ? ? 
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***table 2 here*** 
 
WŽǁĞůů ?Ɛframework has gained significant traction (e.g. Mair and Thomassen, 2010; Costello et al, 
 ? ? ? ? ) ?ĂŶĚŚĂƐďĞĞŶƉƌĂŝƐĞĚĂƐŽĨĨĞƌŝŶŐĂ  ‘ƉůĂƵƐŝďůĞĂƉƉƌŽǆŝŵĂƚŝŽŶŽĨŐŽǀĞƌŶŵĞŶƚĂŶĚŽƉƉŽƐŝƚŝŽŶ
ůĞŐŝƐůĂƚŝǀĞƉŽǁĞƌ ? ?ůĂƵ ? ? ? ? ? ?Ɖ ? ? ? ? ). zĞƚ ŝŶWŽǁĞůů ?ƐŽǁŶĂŶĂůǇƐŝƐ ?the UK emerges as an exemplar 
of executive dominance in which  ‘ƚŚĞ ĐŽŶditions for effective authorized representation are 
ĐĞƌƚĂŝŶůǇƉŽŽƌůǇŵĞƚ ?(2000, p. 111), which stands in contrast with the scholarship discussed in the 
preceding section.  Two inter-connected factors explain this divergence.  Firstly, Powell ?Ɛ ĂŶalysis 
predominantly encompasses the elections of the early 1980s, and therefore predates important 
changes that have since shifted the balance between government and parliament (see below).  
Secondly, by associating ĐŽŵŵŝƚƚĞĞƐƚƌĞŶŐƚŚǁŝƚŚ ‘ƚŚĞĂďŝůŝƚǇŽĨĂĐŽŵŵŝƚƚĞĞƚŽŵŽĚŝĨǇůĞŐŝƐůĂƚŝŽŶ ?
perhaps even introduce legislation of ŝƚƐŽǁŶ ? ?WŽǁĞůů ? ? ? ? ? ?Ɖ ? ? ? ) ?ƚŚĞĨƌĂŵĞǁŽƌŬdoes not account 
for the many different ways in which committees can exert influence upon the actions of 
government.  Indeed, in WŽǁĞůů ?Ɛ analysis ?ƚŚĞh<ƌĞĐĞŝǀĞƐĂƐĐŽƌĞŽĨǌĞƌŽĨŽƌŝƚƐ ‘ǁĞĂŬ ?ƌƵďďĞƌƐƚĂŵƉ
ĐŽŵŵŝƚƚĞĞƐ ? ?WŽǁĞůů, 2000, p. 106)!  It is therefore clear that the parsimony of these categories is at 
the expense of a more nuanced analysis.  More comprehensive schemas are developed elsewhere.  
Schellknecht (1984, cited in Mattson and Strøm, 1995, pp. 258-9), for example, distinguishes 
between ten types of committee system according to permanency, specialisation and responsibility; 
and Strøm (1990) develops a five-point index that enumerates key structural features such as the 
number of committees and dispersal of chairs. Again, however, this scholarship privileges the 
function of legislative scrutiny; and in doing so has portrayed WestminstĞƌ ?ƐĐŽŵŵŝƚƚĞĞƐǇƐƚĞŵĂƐ
 ‘ŵŽƌĞĐĞŶƚƌĂůŝǌĞĚĂŶĚůĞƐƐĚĞůŝďĞƌĂƚŝǀĞ ?  ?Strøm ?  ? ? ? ? ?Ɖ ?  ? ? ) ?ĞǀĞŶĐŽŶƐƚŝƚƵƚŝŶŐĂ  ‘ĚĞǀŝĂŶƚĐĂƐĞ ?ĨŽƌ
ŚĂǀŝŶŐ  ‘ŶŽ ƉĞƌŵĂŶĞŶƚ ĐŽŵŵŝƚƚĞĞƐ ǁŝƚŚ ůĞŐŝƐůĂƚŝǀĞ ĨƵŶĐƚŝŽŶƐ ? DĂƚƚƐŽŶ ĂŶĚStrøm, 1995, p. 260).  
Certainly, Westminster is comparatively unusual for dividing the functions of legislative scrutiny and 
executive oversight between two discrete sets of committees (Benton and Russell, 2013, p. 772). Yet 
ƐŝŶĐĞ ƚŚĞŝƌ ĐƌĞĂƚŝŽŶ ŝŶ  ? ? ? ? ? ƐĞůĞĐƚ ĐŽŵŵŝƚƚĞĞƐ ŚĂǀĞ ďĞĐŽŵĞ ĂŶ  ‘entrenched part of our 
ĐŽŶƐƚŝƚƵƚŝŽŶĂů ĂƌƌĂŶŐĞŵĞŶƚƐ ĂƐ ŶĞǀĞƌ ďĞĨŽƌĞ ?  ?,  ? ? ? ?  ? ? ? ? ); and in recent years have been 
bolstered by ĐƌŝƚŝĐĂů ƌĞĨŽƌŵƐƐƵĐŚĂƐ ƚŚĞ ŝŶƚƌŽĚƵĐƚŝŽŶŽĨ  ‘ĐŽƌĞƚĂƐŬƐ ? ŝŶ  ? ? ? ?ĂŶĚĞůĞĐƚĞĚĐŚĂŝƌƐ ŝŶ
2010.  Appropriate indices are therefore necessary to systematically gauge the opportunities for 
opposition influence that select committees provide. 
 
The five-point index by Strøm (1990) provides a useful starting point, identifying the broad structural 
features that affect a committee ƐǇƐƚĞŵ ?Ɛ ŽƉĞƌĂƚŝŽŶ P ƚŚĞ ŶƵŵďĞƌof standing committees; fixed 
areas of specialisation; specialisation that corresponds with ministerial departments; restrictions on 
the number of committee assignments per legislator; and, the proportional distribution of 
committee chairs. Yet whilst this ƉƌŽǀŝĚĞƐĂƐǇƐƚĞŵĂƚŝĐŵĞĂŶƐŽĨĂƐƐĞƐƐŝŶŐƚŚĞ ‘ƐƚƌƵĐƚƵƌĂůĐŽŶƐƚƌĂŝŶƚƐ
on opposition influence ?  ?^ƚƌƆŵ ?  ? ? ? ? ?Ɖ ?  ? ? ) ? ŝƚĚŽĞƐŶŽƚ  ‘ƚƌĂǀĞů ? ƚŽ ƚŚĞ ƐĞůĞĐƚ ĐŽŵŵŝƚƚ Ğ ƐǇƐƚĞŵ ?
The first three indicators, for example, become tautological as the fact that select committee engage 
in executive oversight by shadowing ministerial departments both determines their number and 
encourages expertise.  Similarly, whilst the distribution of chairs is an important indicator of the 
balance between government and opposition, a simple focus on proportionality is unable to account 
for the inter- and intra-party dynamics that affect this distribution, and in turn the capacity of a chair 
ƚŽĞĨĨĞĐƚŝǀĞůǇĨƵůĨŝůƚŚĞŝƌ ‘ĐƌŽƐƐ-ƉĂƌƚǇ ?ƌŽůĞ ?/ƚĂůƐŽĨĂŝůƐƚŽĂĐĐŽƵŶƚĨŽƌƚŚĞǁŝĚĞƌƉĂƌƚŝƐĂŶďĂůĂŶĐĞŽĨĂ
ĐŽŵŵŝƚƚĞĞ ?Ɛmembership, which is crucial to understanding how a committee undertakes its 
responsibilities.  On this latter point, indicators focusing on the actual responsibilities of a committee 
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ĂƌĞ ĂďƐĞŶƚ ? ǁŚŝĐŚ ƌĞĨůĞĐƚƐ ƚŚĞ ŝŵƉůŝĐŝƚ ĂƐƐƵŵƉƚŝŽŶ ƚŚĂƚ Ă ĐŽŵŵŝƚƚĞĞ ?Ɛ ŵĂŝŶ ĨƵŶĐƚŝŽŶ ŝƐ ůĞŐŝƐůĂƚŝǀĞ
scrutiny.  
 
In response, this article presents the following additive score comprised of five key elements, with 
each receiving a score of 0.05.  The first element is simply the presence of legislative committees, as 
even a minimal or weak committee system provides a platform for some degree of opposition 
influence than would otherwise be the case.  Nonetheless, ad hoc or irregular committees will 
always suffer from structural limitations, and recognising this the second element awards an 
additional score for a systematic committee structure that corresponds with the functions of the 
executive.  Attention then turns to the composition of the committees.  Whilst the distribution of 
chairs is an important indicator of the balance between government and opposition, focusing on 
chairs alones does not capƚƵƌĞ ǁŝĚĞƌ ƉĂƌƚŝƐĂŶ ďĂůĂŶĐĞ ŽĨ Ă ĐŽŵŵŝƚƚĞĞ ?Ɛ ŵĞŵďĞƌƐŚŝƉ ?dŚĞ
proportionality of membership matters, so the third element focuses on the distribution of chairs 
and ŵĞŵďĞƌƐ ?,ŽǁĞǀĞƌ ?ƚŚĞ ‘ĂĚĚĞĚ-ǀĂůƵĞ ?ŽĨĂƉƌŽƉŽƌƚŝŽŶĂůŵĞŵďĞƌƐŚŝƉǁŝůůďĞůŝŵŝƚĞĚŝĨƚŚŽƐĞŽŶ 
a committee owe their positions to party patronage; and the fourth element awards a score for the 
existence of independent selection procedures.  Finally, it is necessary to consider the extent that 
the powers of legislative committees are formalised, as ǁŝƚŚŽƵƚĂĐůĞĂƌƐĞƚŽĨĨƵŶĐƚŝŽŶƐ ?ĐŽŵŵŝƚƚĞĞƐ ?
activities risk being ineffective.  The fifth element accordingly awards a score for the existence of 
clearly defined and commonly accepted responsibilities.  The maximum score that a committee 
system can receive is 0.25, which corresponds with the maximum proposed by Powell, and therefore 
preserves the balance between the two aspects of opposition influence.  Together, these 
modifications enable a more nuanced analysis of the quality of Westminster democracy that not 
only moves beyond binary distinctions betweeŶ  ‘ŐŽǀĞƌŶŵĞŶƚ ? ĂŶĚ  ‘ŽƉƉŽƐŝƚŝŽŶ ? ďƵƚ ĂůƐŽ
acknowledges the importance of executive oversight as a form of opposition influence.   The next 
section puts this into effect.  
 
3. Opposition influence and the effective representation of an electoral majority  
 
To calculate the total conditions for effective representation at Westminster, each parliament since 
1945 is first scored in accordance with the (revised) criteria detailed above.  These scores are 
presented in table 3.  /Ŷ ƚĞƌŵƐ ŽĨ  ‘ďĂƌŐĂŝŶŝŶŐ ǁŝƚŚ ŐŽǀĞƌŶŵĞŶƚ ? ? ƚŚĞ ƐĐŽƌĞƐ ŝŶƚĂďůĞ 3 reflect the 
near-total domination of majority governments, wherein the only exceptions have been the short-
lived Lib-Lab Pact of 1977-8 and the brief period towards the end of the 1992-7 parliament when 
:ŽŚŶDĂũŽƌ ?s Conservative Government lost its majority.   WŽǁĞůůĂƌŐƵĞƐƚŚĂƚ ‘ŝĨĂŐŽǀĞƌŶŵĞŶƚŚĂƐĂ
clear majority, however achieved ? ƚŚĞ ƉƌŽďĂďŝůŝƚǇ ŽĨ ŝŶĨůƵĞŶĐĞ ŝƐ ůŽǁ ?  ?WŽǁĞůů ?  ? ? ? ? ?Ɖ   ? ? ?  W 
emphasis added), and the prevailing score 0.1 suggests that capacity of non-government 
parliamentarians to exert influence on the floor of the House is limited.   A score of 0.1 also 
correspondƐ ǁŝƚŚ WŽǁĞůů ?Ɛown analysis, when he ĐŽŶĐůƵĚĞĚ ƚŚĂƚ Ă  ‘ƐŽůŝĚ ŐŽǀĞƌŶŵĞŶƚ ŵĂũŽƌŝƚǇ ?
ƌĞŶĚĞƌĞĚWĂƌůŝĂŵĞŶƚĂƐůŝƚƚůĞŵŽƌĞƚŚĂŶĂ ‘ĨŽƌƵŵ ?ĨŽƌŽƉƉŽƐŝƚŝŽŶŵĞŵďĞƌƐ ‘ƚŽƚĂŬĞƚŚĞŝƌĐĂƐĞƚŽƚŚĞ
ƉƵďůŝĐ ?  ? ? ? ? ? ? Ɖ ?  ? ? ? ) ? WŽǁĞůů ?Ɛ ĂŶĂůǇƐŝƐpredominantly focuses on the 1980s; and in light of 
contemporary evidence, such findings may appear surprising.  After all, it was shown above that the 
last parliament was the most rebellious on record!  Recent years have also witnessed several 
reforms to parliamentary procedures, including ƚŚĞ ƌĂƚŝŽŶĂůŝƐĂƚŝŽŶ ŽĨ WƌŝŵĞ DŝŶŝƐƚĞƌ ?Ɛ YƵĞƐƚŝŽŶƐ
(1997); the utilisation of Westminster Hall as an ancillary debating chamber (2000); the 
modernisation of House sitting hours (2005, 2012); and, the creation of the Backbench Business 
Committee to schedule backbench business time (2010).  However, many of these reforms have 
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ĨŽĐƵƐĞĚ ŽŶ ŵĂƚƚĞƌƐ ŽĨ  ‘ĞĨĨŝĐŝĞŶĐǇ ? ƌĂƚŚĞƌ ƚŚĂŶ  ‘ĞĨĨĞĐƚŝǀĞŶĞƐƐ ?  ?Kelso, 2009); and should be 
ƵŶĚĞƌƐƚŽŽĚĂƐ ‘ĐŽƐŵĞƚŝĐ ?Žƌ ‘ŵŽĚĞƌĂƚĞ ? ?ƌĂƚŚĞƌƚŚĂŶ ‘ĨƵŶĚĂŵĞŶƚĂů ?(Flinders, 2007; BLINDED, 2016).  
 
 
***table 3 here*** 
 
In terms ŽĨ ‘ůĞŐŝƐůĂƚŝǀĞĐŽŵŵŝƚƚĞĞƐƚƌƵĐƚƵƌĞs ? ?ƚŚĞƐĐŽƌĞƐŝŶƚĂďůĞ3 underline two distinct phases of 
select committee development. The most significant event was the creation of a systematic system 
of select committees corresponding to ministerial departments in 1979.  By mirroring the 
departmental structure, select committees were intended to function as  ‘police patrols ? (McCubbins 
and Schwartz, 1984) ?ďĞĐŽŵŝŶŐ ‘ƚŚĞ “ĞǇĞƐĂŶĚĞĂƌƐ ?ŽĨƚŚĞ,ŽƵƐĞ ?ďǇ drawing attention  ‘to matters 
which require further political consideration ?; whilst also  ‘mak[ing] the decisions of Parliament and 
'ŽǀĞƌŶŵĞŶƚ ŵŽƌĞ ƌĞƐƉŽŶƐŝǀĞ ƚŽ ƚŚĞ ǁŝƐŚĞƐ ŽĨ ƚŚĞ ĞůĞĐƚŽƌĂƚĞ ? ?  ?,  ? ? ?-I, 1978, p. viii).  The 
introduction of the modern select committee system was therefore a critical juncture; and reflecting 
on its impact after 20 years, the Liaison Committee stated that: 
It has enabled the questioning of Ministers and civil servants, and has forced them to explain 
ƉŽůŝĐŝĞƐ Q/ƚƐǀĞƌǇĞǆŝƐƚĞnce has been a constant reminder to Ministers and officials, and many others 
in positions of power and influence, of the spotlight that may swing their way when least welcome ?
It has also shown the House of Commons at its best: working on the basis of fact, not supposition or 
prejudice; and with constructive co-operation rather than routine disagreement (HC 300, 2000, paras. 
4-5 W emphasis added). 
The capacity of select committees to fulfil this  ‘ĐƌŽƐƐ-ƉĂƌƚǇ ?ŵŽĚĞ ?ǁŚŝĐŚ<ŝŶŐ (1976) had previously 
argued was antithetical to British parliamentary practice) was underpinned by the largely 
proportional dispersal of both chairs and members.  However, whilst membership mirrored that of 
the House as far as arithmetic would allow, and whilst powers of appointment formally lay with the 
Committee of Selection, party managers effectively controlled the process as recommendations 
emerged from private inter-party negotiations.  Moreover, the perceived lack of esteem attached to 
the task of oversight and the lack of clearly defined responsibilities for committees was seen as 
ĐŽŶƚƌŝďƵƚŝŶŐƚŽƚŚĞŝƌŝŶĐŽŶƐŝƐƚĞŶƚŝŵƉĂĐƚ PĨŽƌŐŽǀĞƌŶŵĞŶƚďĞŝŶŐ ‘ƚoo ready - and [finding] it too easy 
- ƚŽƚŚǁĂƌƚĂĐŽŵŵŝƚƚĞĞ ?ƐůĞŐŝƚŝŵĂƚĞƉƵƌƉŽƐĞ ? ?, ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ?ƉĂƌĂ ? ? ) ? 
 
A second phase of development has therefore entailed reforms relating to the resources enjoyed by 
select committees.  Recognising ƚŚĂƚ  ‘ŵŝŶŝƐƚĞƌŝĂů ŽĨĨŝĐĞ ŚĂƐ Ă ƉŽǁĞƌĨƵů ĂƚƚƌĂĐƚŝŽŶ ?(HC 300, 2000, 
para. 29), the Liaison Committee recommended that executive oversight be repositioned as an 
 ?ĂůƚĞƌŶĂƚŝǀĞ ĐĂƌĞĞƌ ?, recognised by an additional salary for chairs.  This was echoed by the 
Modernisation Committee, which ĂƌŐƵĞĚ ƚŚĂƚ  ‘[a]s long as Government office is the principal 
Parliamentary role to be recognised by additional payment, it need not be surprising that the role of 
scrutiny should be regĂƌĚĞĚďǇƚŚĞǁŽƌůĚĂƐŝŶĨĞƌŝŽƌ ? ?, ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ?ƉĂƌĂ ? ? ? ) ?/n 2002, the House 
agreed to this additional payment.  There remained, however, concerns regarding the independence 
of appointments; and in 2009 the Wright Committee proposed the election of chairs by the whole 
House, and the election of members by secret ballot within each political party  ‘using transparent 
and democratic means ?ǁŝƚŚƚŚĞŽƵƚĐŽŵĞ Qendorsed ďǇƚŚĞ,ŽƵƐĞ ? (HC 1117, 2009, para. 80).  The 
election of chairs was agreed by the House in May 2010, and secret ballots followed in June 2010.  
The House stopped short in implementing proposals pertaining to members, and instead conceded 
ƚŽ  ‘ĞŶĚŽƌƐĞ ƚŚĞ ƉƌŝŶĐŝƉůĞ ? ŽĨ ƚƌĂŶƐƉĂƌĞŶƚ ĞůĞĐƚŝŽŶƐ ǁithin parties (HC Deb, 4 March 2010, c1095). 
Further reforms have focused on select committees ?ƌĞƐƉŽŶƐŝďŝůŝƚŝĞƐ.  In 2002, the Liaison Committee 
proposed a series of ten core tasks to  ‘provide an assurance to the House, and to the public, that 
departments are more fully exposed to the searchlight of scrutiny ?(HC 558, 2002, para. 15).  These 
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core tasks were subsequently adopted by resolution of the House, and focused on the broad areas 
of departmental policy, expenditure and administration.  A decade later, the Liaison Committee 
revisited these tasks, instigating several changes intended to improve ĐŽŵŵŝƚƚĞĞƐ ? effectiveness (HC 
697, 2012).  Together, these reforms have bolstered the capacity of select committees; and whilst 
structures alone cannot determine behaviour, it is clear that ƚŚĞǇ ŚĂǀĞ ĐŽŶƚƌŝďƵƚĞĚ ƚŽ Ă  ‘ŶĞǁ
ĐŽŶĨŝĚĞŶĐĞĂŶĚĂƵƚŚŽƌŝƚǇ ? ?/ŶƐƚŝƚƵƚĞĨŽƌ'ŽǀĞƌŶŵĞŶƚ ? ? ? ? ? ?Ɖ ? ? ).  The introduction of chair elections 
in particular has been seen as critiĐĂůĨŽƌ ‘Őŝǀ ?ŝŶŐ ?ƚŚŽƐĞĐŚŽƐĞŶĂŐƌĞĂƚĞƌĚĞŐƌĞĞŽĨĂƵƚŚŽƌŝƚǇŝŶƚŚĞŝƌ
ƌŽůĞŝŶƚŚĞ,ŽƵƐĞ ?ƚŚĞŝƌƌĞůĂƚŝŽŶƐŚŝƉǁŝƚŚŵŝŶŝƐƚĞƌƐĂŶĚƚŚĞŝƌƐƚĂŶĚŝŶŐŝŶƚŚĞǁŝĚĞƌĐŽŵŵƵŶŝƚǇ ? ?,
954, 2015, para. 8).  Indeed committees have been increasingly willing to move beyond their 
ƚƌĂĚŝƚŝŽŶĂů  ‘ƉŽůŝĐĞ ƉĂƚƌŽů ?  ?DĐƵďďŝŶƐ ĂŶĚ ^ĐŚǁĂƌƚǌ ?  ? ? ? ? ) ŵŽĚĞ ŽĨ ĞǆĞĐƵƚŝǀĞ oversight, sounding 
 ‘ĨŝƌĞ ĂůĂƌŵƐ ? ŽŶ ŝƐƐƵĞƐ ŝŶĐůƵĚŝŶŐ ĐŚŝůĚ ƐĞǆƵĂů ĞǆƉůŽŝƚĂƚŝŽŶ ? ƉŚŽŶĞ ŚĂĐŬŝŶŐ ĂŶĚ ƚĂǆ ĞǀĂƐŝŽŶ.  In this 
context, it is little wonder that the Liaison Committee concluded that  ‘[o]ur overall impression is that 
government departments are taking committees seriously and engaging positively with them ? (HC 
954, 2015, para. 16). 
 
Having delineated the institutional opportunities for opposition influence, it is now possible to 
determine the extent to which these structures have bridged the gap between the electorate with 
policymaking. Table 4 below calculates the total conditions for effective representation at 
Westminster.   As discussed above, the ongoing erosion of the vote basis of government has 
rendered the dispersal of office payoffs as increasing disproportional, which has prompted critical 
questions about the governing legitimacy of single party executives comprised of bare plurality 
winners (e.g. Nagel, 2000; Dunleavy and Margetts, 2001; Judge, 2004).  However, when structural 
opportunities for non-government parties to achieve policy payoffs are taken into account, table 4 
reveals that in the majority of instances, the conditions have existed for a majority of voters to be 
effectively represented in the policy process.  The greatest contribution to the total conditions for 
effective representation has been made the second aspect of opposition influence, the legislative 
committee structure. Table 4 demonstrates the way in which the strengthening of the institutional 
basis of ƐĞůĞĐƚĐŽŵŵŝƚƚĞĞƐŚĂƐďĞĞŶĐƌŝƚŝĐĂůŝŶŽĨĨƐĞƚƚŝŶŐƚŚĞǁĞĂŬĞŶŝŶŐŽĨŐŽǀĞƌŶŵĞŶƚƐ ?ǀŽƚĞďĂƐŝƐ ?
in turn providing partial redress to the disproportionality of office shares. Indeed, the way in which 
governments have responded to demands for reform made by Liaison Committee and 
Modernisation Committee runs counter ƚŽ ‘ŵĂũŽƌŝƚĂƌŝĂŶƉƌĞŵŝƐĞ ? ?ǁŚŝĐŚĂŶƚŝĐŝƉĂƚĞƐƚŚĂƚ if  ‘powers 
and assignments were to systematically thwart the ŵĂũŽƌŝƚǇ ?Ɛ ǁŝůů ? ƚŚĞŶ ƚŚĞ ŵĂũŽƌŝƚǇ ƐŚŽuld not, 
ƌĂƚŝŽŶĂůůǇ ?ĂĚŽƉƚƚŚĞŵ ? ?Mattson and Strøm, 1995, p. 253).  By applying the modified scoring criteria 
detailed above, these results challenges existing comparative analyses in which select committees 
have emerged as  ‘ǁĞĂŬ ? ?WŽǁĞůů ? ? ? ? ? ?Ɖ ? ? ? ? )ĂŶĚ ‘ĚĞǀŝĂŶƚ ? ?Mattson and Strøm, 1995, p. 260); and 
instead dovetail with scholarship that has demonstrated the ways in which select committees serve 
as critical channel for non-government parliamentarians to exercise direct impact and indirect 
influence (e.g. Hindmoor et al 2009; Benton and Russell, 2013).   
 
***table 4 here*** 
 
The opportunities for influence provided by the plenary session have also contributed to the total 
conditions for effective representation, albeit to a lesser degree. The capacity of the plenary to exert 
influence has been most evident in times of minority or supported government, as illustrated by the 
scores applied to the periods 1974-9 and 1992-7.  As suggested above, Powell is sceptical about the 
ĐĂƉĂĐŝƚǇĨŽƌŽƉƉŽƐŝƚŝŽŶďĂƌŐĂŝŶŝŶŐŝŶƚŝŵĞƐŽĨŵĂũŽƌŝƚǇŐŽǀĞƌŶŵĞŶƚ ?ĂƐƐŝŐŶŝŶŐĂƐĐŽƌĞŽĨ ‘ŽŶůǇ ? ? ? ?ƚŽ
 ‘ƌĞŵŝŶĚƵƐƚŚĂƚƚŚĞŽƉƉŽƐŝƚŝŽŶĐĂŶƵƐĞƚŚĞůĞŐŝƐůĂƚŝǀĞĨŽƌƵŵƚŽƚƌǇƚŽƐŚĂƉĞƚŚĞŐŽǀĞƌŶŵĞŶƚ ?ƐĂĐƚŝŽŶ
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ďǇƌŽƵƐŝŶŐƉƵďůŝĐŽƉŝŶŝŽŶ ? ?WŽǁĞůů ? ? ? ? ? ?Ɖ ? 105).  Nonetheless, this still improves on the zero-sum 
dispersal of office shares typically associated with majoritarianism, suggesting a greater possibility 
than non-government parliamentarians can achieve policy payoffs than a relegation to mere 
opposition would imply (c.f. Lijphart, 2012).  Moreover, whilst the plenary session may provide 
opposition parties with few formal opportunities to affect policy, evidence in the previous section 
demonstrates that WĂƌůŝĂŵĞŶƚĞǆĞƌƚƐĂďŽƚŚĂ ‘ƌĞĂĐƚŝǀĞ ?ĂŶĚ ‘ƉƌĞǀĞŶƚĂƚŝǀĞ ?ŝŶĨůƵĞ ĐĞ ?ůŽŶĚĞů ? ? ? ? ? ?
pp. 78, 82) which is often more indirect and less visible.  Of course, the extent to which this, or 
indeed any, scoring system is able to fully capture these less visible forms of power is open to debate 
(an issue discussed in the conclusion).  However, by systematically identifying the structural 
opportunities for opposition parties to bargain with the government, the results in table 4 do qualify 
the assertion that at Westminster  ‘ĂůĂƌŐĞŵŝŶŽƌŝƚǇŝƐĞǆĐůƵĚĞĚĨƌŽŵ power and condemned to the 
ƌŽůĞŽĨŽƉƉŽƐŝƚŝŽŶ ? ?>ŝũƉŚĂƌƚ ? ? ? ? ? ?Ɖ ? ? ? )ǁŚŽƐĞƌŽůĞŝƐ ‘ƐŝŵƉůǇƚŽĐƌŝƚŝĐŝǌĞ ?(Strøm, 1990, p. 42).  
 
Together, these findings moderate the (implicitly negative) portrayal of Westminster as an exemplar 
of majoritarianism.  Comparative scholarship has cast Westminster ?Ɛ government as exclusionary 
and its parliament as feeble, lacking teeth to affect the activities of the executive.  However, the 
primacy given to the function of legislative scrutiny has resulted in an inherent misunderstanding of 
ParliaŵĞŶƚ ?ƐƌŽůĞĂƐĂĐŚĂŵďĞƌŽĨĞǆĞĐƵƚŝǀĞŽǀĞƌƐŝŐŚƚ ?ǁŚŝĐŚin turn neglects the ways in which the 
structures of Westminster have been configured to realise this function.  These findings also 
challenge the assumption that the election is ƚŚĞ ‘ĚĞĐŝƐŝǀĞƐƚĂŐĞ ?ŝŶŵĂũŽƌŝƚǇĨŽƌŵĂƚŝŽŶ ?ĂƐŝƚŝƐĐůĞĂƌ
that these structures provide the conditions for ongoing negotiation and trade-off between the two 
branches of government: features typically associated with the  ‘consensus ? vision of democracy.  
ŽŶƚƌĂƌǇ ƚŽ ƚŚĞ ĚŝĐŚŽƚŽŵŽƵƐ ĚŝǀŝƐŝŽŶ ďĞƚǁĞĞŶ  ‘ǁŝŶŶĞƌƐ ?ĂŶĚ  ‘ůŽƐĞƌƐ ? ŝŵƉůŝĞĚ ďǇ ŵĂũŽƌŝƚĂƌŝĂŶŝƐŵ ?
non-government parliamentarians have an increasing range of powers at their disposal through 
which they can affect the policy process.  Indeed, whilst 1974 is often regarded as the watershed for 
the demise of two-ƉĂƌƚǇƉŽůŝƚŝĐƐĂŶĚƚŚĞĂƐĐĞŶƚŽĨ  ‘ĞůĞĐƚŝǀĞĚŝĐƚĂƚŽƌƐŚŝƉ ?  ?ƐĞĞƵŶůĞĂǀǇ ?  ? ? ? ? ) ?ƚŚĞ
average of the total conditions for effective representation is 53.5 for both 1945-74 and 1974-2015!  
More recently, for the period 1997-2015 the average conditions for effective representation is 54.8.  
It is important not to overstate these findings.  Whilst Powell does not offer a criterion to assess the 
quality of effective representation, he does suggĞƐƚƚŚĂƚ ‘ƐĐŽƌĞƐŝŶƚŚĞŚŝŐŚ ? ?ƐĂŶĚůŽǁ ? ?Ɛ ?ƉƌŽǀŝĚĞ
 ‘ŐŽŽĚĐŽŶĚŝƚŝŽŶƐĨŽƌŵĞĂŶŝŶŐĨƵůĂƵƚŚŽƌŝǌĞĚƌĞƉƌĞƐĞŶƚĂƚŝŽŶ ?  ?WŽǁĞůů ? ? ? ? ? ?Ɖ ? ? ? ? ).   In the UK, the 
only period to achieve such a score was the 2010-15 period of coalition government, and as table 4 
shows, the score of 70.5 is predominantly comprised of ŐŽǀĞƌŶŵĞŶƚ ?Ɛ ŵĂũŽƌŝƚǇ ǀŽƚĞ ďĂƐŝƐ ?
EŽŶĞƚŚĞůĞƐƐ ?WŽǁĞůůĚŽĞƐƐƵŐŐĞƐƚƚŚĂƚƐĐŽƌĞƐĂƌŽƵŶĚƚŚĞ ‘ŵŝĚƉŽŝŶƚ ?ĂƌĞ ‘ƉůĂƵƐŝďůĞ ? (Powell, 2000, p. 
111); and by distinguishing between office payoff and policy payoff, the findings of this article 
challenges arguments that ƚŚĞŵĂũŽƌŝƚǇŽĨǀŽƚĞƌƐ ‘ƵƚƚĞƌůǇƵŶƌĞƉƌĞƐĞŶƚĞĚ ? ?^ŚƵŐĂƌƚ ? ?  ? ? ?Ɖ ? ? ? ? )Žƌ
that governments pursue  ‘ƉŽůŝĐŝĞƐƐƵƉƉŽƌƚĞĚďǇŽŶůǇĂƐŵĂůůŶƵŵďĞƌŽĨǀŽƚĞƌƐ ?EĂŐĞů ? ? ? ? ? ?Ɖ ? ? ? ? ) ?
Moreover, by focusing on the overall conditions for effective representation, the seemingly mutual 
exclusivity of the modes of representation associated with the majoritarian and consensus visions of 
democracy becomes less certain (see Kaiser et al, 2002), which admits the possibility of Ă  ‘ƐǁĞĞƚ-
ƐƉŽƚ ?(Carey and Hix, 2011) between representation and accountability. 
 
4. Conclusion: Understanding the quality of Westminster democracy 
By focusing on the dispersal of policy payoffs, this article has challenged crude portrayals of 
Westminster democracy as adversarial, zero-sum and elitist.  As Strøm and Mattson argue, 
 ‘ůĞŐŝƐůĂƚŝǀĞ ŽƌŐĂŶŝƐĂƚŝŽŶ ŵĂƚƚĞƌƐ ? /ŶƐƚŝƚƵƚŝŽŶĂů ƐƚƌƵĐƚƵƌĞs, procedures, and rules are assumed to 
affect the distribution of legislative power and ultimately public poůŝĐǇ ?(1995, p. 256); and this 
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article has demonstrated a quantifiable shift towards the legislature, which has provided the 
institutional conditions for Parliament to exert influence over government.  By developing a 
systematic means of identifying the structural aspects of opposition influence, this article therefore 
offers an important counterpoint to arguments ƚŚĂƚ tĞƐƚŵŝŶƐƚĞƌ ŝƐ  ‘Ă ƐƚĂŶĚŽƵƚ ĐĂƐĞ ŽĨ ŶĞŐĂƚŝǀĞ
ƌĂƚŚĞƌƚŚĂŶĐŽŶƐƚƌƵĐƚŝǀĞŽƉƉŽƐŝƚŝŽŶĂůƉŽůŝƚŝĐƐ ? ?ŶĚĞǁĞŐ ? ? ? ? ? ?Ɖ ? ? ? )ŝŶǁŚŝĐŚ all non-government 
actors are excluded from the process of policymaking.  A number of important studies have clearly 
demonstrated the myriad of ways in which Parliament has affected the behaviour of government 
and its legislative outputs (e.g. Hindmoor, 2009; Benton and Russell, 2013; Russell et al, 2015; 
Russell and Cowley, 2016); and this article complements this literature by identifying the structural 
conditions that enable opposition parties to achieve policy payoffs.  Whilst previous analyses have 
privileged the function of legislative scrutiny (e.g. Strøm, 1990; Mattson and Strøm, 1995), the 
indicators developed in this article have enabled the function of executive oversight to be subject to 
the same degree of systematisation.  Free of inherently ŶŽƌŵĂƚŝǀĞĂƐƐƵŵƉƚŝŽŶƐĂďŽƵƚƚŚĞ ‘ƉƌŽƉĞƌ ?
ƌŽůĞ ŽĨ ůĞŐŝƐůĂƚŝǀĞ ĂĐƚŽƌƐ ? ƚŚŝƐ ĂƌƚŝĐůĞ ?Ɛ ĂŶĂůǇƚŝĐĂů ĨƌĂŵĞǁŽƌŬ ŝƐ ŝŶŶŽǀĂƚŝǀĞ ĂŶĚ has significant 
comparative potential, enabling comparison between different regime types and legislative cultures.  
Indeed, the alternative index of committee influence can also be used to conduct within-case 
comparative analysis, focusing on the capacity of different types of committee within the same 
polity.   
 
This article also illuminates a number of areas for further research.  Whilst this article has focused on 
ƚŚĞƐƚƌƵĐƚƵƌĂů  ‘ŝŶƉƵƚƐ ?ŽĨƉĂƌůŝĂŵĞŶƚĂƌǇ ŝŶĨůƵĞŶĐĞ ?ƌĂƚŚĞƌ ƚŚĂŶ  ‘ŽƵƚƉƵƚƐ ?ŽĨ ůĞŐŝƐůĂƚƵƌĞďĞŚĂǀŝŽƵƌŽƌ
policy impact, it is clear that institutional structures have affective properties.  This has been 
illustrated by the confidence and assertiveness that has characterised select committee chairs since 
the introduction of popular elections.  At present, the causal connection between these inputs and 
the subsequent outputs remains understudied, and future research should interrogate this to 
enhance our understanding of their relationship and to provide insights regarding the extent to 
which legislative institutions can be engineered to improve the representativeness of policymaking.  
Future research should also consider the extent to which opposition members utilise non-
parliamentary means to exert influence upon government, for example through the media or 
through popular campaigns.  It is clear that the vote basis of many smaller parties belies their 
capacity to extract policy payoffs, most clearly evidenced by the way in which the Conservative Party 
and Labour have responded to the electoral threat posed by UKIP.  However, by weighting the 
power and influence of parties relative to their share of the vote, measures such as the effective 
number of parties and the index of effective representation do not capture the political context in 
which opposition influence is exercised; and any extended scoring scheme should therefore seek to 
account for such factors (see Blau, 2008).   
 
 
Finally, future research should focus on the alignment between parties and voters to determine the 
extent to which parties, and in turn policymakers, are truly responsive to the preferences of the 
electorate.  In developing the index of effective representation, this article has focused on votes as a 
proxy for policy preferences, a methodological simplification that has been necessary to capture the 
direction and degree of change over the sixty-year period.  Nonetheless, it should not be assumed 
that the electorate ?Ɛ ƉƌĞĨĞƌĞŶĐĞƐ can be ascertained from their voting behaviour.  A number of 
studies have drawn attention to the increasingly narrow ideological space occupied by mainstream 
parties (e.g. Dunleavy and Margetts, 2001), and it has been argued that  ‘ǀŽƚĞ-seeking parties have 
left the British ƉĂƌƚǇ ƐǇƐƚĞŵ ůĞƐƐ ƌĞƉƌĞƐĞŶƚĂƚŝǀĞ ŽĨ ƚŚĞ ŝĚĞŽůŽŐŝĐĂů ĚŝǀĞƌƐŝƚǇ ŝŶ ƚŚĞ ĞůĞĐƚŽƌĂƚĞ ?
(Brandenburg and Johns, 2013, p. 704).  In turn, a focus on voting behaviour is unidimensional and 
fails to account for the complexity ŽĨĂŶŝŶĚŝǀŝĚƵĂůǀŽƚĞƌ ?s preference structure, particularly in terms 
of preference ranking and the relative acceptability of different electoral outcomes (Dunleavy 2005). 
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To further develop the concept of effective representation, future research should therefore seek to 
capture the congruency between party positions and voter preferences, the effect on electoral rules 
on patterns of party competition, and the extent to which such factors interact to condition voting 
behaviour and preference structures.   
 
 
In the context of declining turnout and general democratic malaise, the implications of the 
burgeoning disconnect between voters and policymakers are stark, and research suggests that the 
way in which ǀŽƚĞƌƐ ŚĂǀĞďĞĐŽŵĞ  ‘ŝĚĞŽůŽŐŝĐĂůůǇ ĚŝƐĞŶĨƌĂŶĐŚŝƐĞĚ ? ŚĂƐ  ‘ƚĂŬĞŶ ŝƚƐ ƚŽůů ŽŶ ĚĞŵŽĐƌĂƚŝĐ
ƐĂƚŝƐĨĂĐƚŝŽŶ ? ?Brandenburg and Johns, 2013, p. 705).  Indeed, when turnout is taken into account, the 
net effect of the 2015 general election was that nearly half of all voters lacked an authorised voice to 
represent their interests.  /ƚŚĂƐďĞĞŶĂƌŐƵĞĚƚŚĂƚĚĞĐůŝŶŝŶŐƚƵƌŶŽƵƚƌĞƉƌĞƐĞŶƚƐ ‘a rational response 
by voters to a primitive Commons electoral system that renders irrelevant so many deeply felt votes ?
(Dunleavy, 2005, p. 530).  Indeed ?ƚŚĞ,ĂŶƐĂƌĚ^ŽĐŝĞƚǇ ?ƐƌĞĐĞŶƚAudit of Political Engagement (2016) 
reveals that although 73% agree that ParliaŵĞŶƚ ‘ŝƐĞƐƐĞŶƚŝĂůƚŽŽƵƌĚĞŵŽĐƌĂĐǇ ? ?ŽŶůǇ ? ?A?ĂŐƌĞĞƚŚĂƚ
the system by which Britain is governed works well; only 32% are satisfied with the way Parliament 
works; and only 28% believe that Parliament encourages public involvement in politics.  Yet as this 
article has demonstrated, portrayals of Westminster government as unresponsive and 
unrepresentative have often neglected the capacity of the legislature to achieve policy payoffs; and 
it has been argued that ƐƵĐŚ ‘ĐƌƵĚĞĂƐƐƵŵƉƚŝŽŶƐ ?ŚĂǀĞ ‘ĐŽŶƚƌŝďƵƚĞĚƚŽƚŚĞĞƌŽƐŝŽŶŽĨƉƵďůŝĐƐƵƉƉŽƌƚ
for ƉŽůŝƚŝĐƐ ?(Flinders and Kelso, 2011, p. 249). Yet, as Brandenburg and Johns have demonstrated, 
ƐĂƚŝƐĨĂĐƚŝŽŶǁŝƚŚĚĞŵŽĐƌĂĐǇĐĂŶďĞĚĞƌŝǀĞĚ ‘from finding some close representation of their policy 
preferences in parliament, whether from the opposition or the governing party. (2013, p. 710).  The 
language used to describe political institutions therefore matters, and deployed effectively can be 
used to foster greater public understanding and engagement.  Used carelessly, however, and the risk 
exists that dissatisfaction will deepen  W as vividly illustrated by the widespread public 
disappointment in New Zealand following electoral reform (see Nagel, 2000). In the context of 
democratic disengagement, academics therefore play a vital role in promoting popular 
understanding of political institutions; and in addressing assumptions that have been allowed to 
remain unchecked.  
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Table 1: Proportionality of representation at Westminster, 1945-2015 
General 
election 
Turnout 
(%) 
As percentage of votes cast As percentage of electorate 
Effective 
number of 
parliamentary 
parties
2
 
Effective 
number of 
electoral 
parties
3 
Effective 
number of 
cabinet 
parties
4
 
Gallagher 
index of 
disproportion
ality 
Vote basis of the 
legislature 
(opposition and 
government) (%)
1
 
Vote basis of 
government 
(%) 
Vote basis of 
the legislature 
(opposition 
and 
government) 
(%)
1
 
Vote basis of 
government (%) 
1945 72.8 86.2 47.7 62.3 34.7 2.11 2.71 1.0 11.61 
1950 83.9 90.0 46.1 75.5 38.7 2.43 2.88 1.0 6.59 
1951 82.6 95.9 44.3* 79.2 36.6* 2.19 2.29 1.0 2.43 
1955 76.8 95.0 49.7 73.0 47.2 2.16 2.00 1.0 5.04 
1959 78.7 91.5 49.4 72.0 45.2 2.28 1.99 1.0 7.28 
1964 77.1 88.9 44.1 68.5 39.2 2.53 2.06 1.0 8.93 
1966 75.8 90.2 48.0 68.4 43.3 2.41 2.02 1.0 8.49 
1970 72.0 91.3 46.4 65.7 42.4 2.33 2.07 1.0 6.28 
1974 (F) 78.8 79.7 37.2* 62.8 29.6* 2.25 3.12 1.0 15.46 
1974 (O) 72.8 80.1 39.2 58.3 28.5 2.25 3.16 1.0 15.01 
1979 76.0 84.5 43.9 64.2 33.4 2.15 2.87 1.0 11.58 
1983 72.7 76.8 42.4 55.8 30.8 2.09 3.12 1.0 20.58 
1987 75.3 79.4 42.2 59.8 31.8 2.17 3.07 1.0 17.75 
1992 77.7 82.1 41.9 64.4 32.6 2.27 3.06 1.0 13.55 
1997 71.3 78.7 43.2 56.1 30.8 2.13 3.22 1.0 16.51 
2001 59.4 78.1 40.7 46.6 24.2 2.17 3.33 1.0 17.76 
2005 61.4 79.7 35.2 48.9 21.6 2.47 3.59 1.0 16.68 
2010 65.1 91.6 59.1 59.6 38.8 2.58 3.72 1.52 15.08 
2015 66.4 76.2 36.9 50.6 24.5 2.54 3.87 1.0 14.89 
* plurality losers returned with largest number of seats 
 
1. The percentage of votes won by each of the parties in government, plus the lower of the percentage of votes or seats won by each opposition party (see Powell, 2000, pp. 95-7). 
2.  ‘ĨĨĞĐƚŝǀĞŶƵŵďĞƌŽĨƉĂƌƚŝĞƐ ?ĂƉƉůŝĞĚƚŽƐĞĂƚƐǁŽŶ ? 
3.  ‘ĨĨĞĐƚŝǀĞŶƵŵďĞƌŽĨƉĂƌƚŝĞƐ ?ĂƉƉůŝĞĚƚŽǀŽƚĞƐĐĂƐƚ ? 
4.  ‘ĨĨĞĐƚŝǀĞŶƵŵďĞƌŽĨƉĂƌƚŝĞƐ ?ĂƉƉůŝĞĚƚŽƐĞĂƚƐŝŶĐĂďŝŶĞƚ ?ƐĞĞůĂƵ ? ? ? ? ? ).
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Table 2: Scoring scheme for the index of effective representation  
 
  
Bargaining with the 
government (all parties) 
Legislative committee structure 
(opposition parties)  ? WŽǁĞůů ?Ɛ
original criteria 
Legislative committee structure 
(opposition parties)  ? Revised 
criteria 
1.0  W government party 
 
0.75  W official support party 
 
0.5  W opposition party facing 
minority government 
 
0.2  W opposition party facing 
supported minority government 
 
0.1  W opposition party facing 
majority government 
0.25  W strong committees with 
chairs equally shared amongst 
all large parties 
 
0.125  W either strong 
committees chaired by 
government parties or weak 
committees with shared chairs 
0.05  W Existence of committees 
 
0.05  W Correspondence with 
ministerial portfolios 
 
0.05  W Proportional 
membership 
 
0.05  W Independent selection 
procedures 
 
0.05  W Defined and accepted 
tasks 
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Table 3: Opportunities for influence at Westminster, 1945-2015 
*Lib-Lab Pact, which lasted from March 1977 until September 1978.  It was therefore in existence for 18 months of the 54-month 
parliament, i.e. 33.3%. 
 ? ?:ŽŚŶDĂũŽƌ ?ƐŽŶƐĞƌǀĂƚŝǀĞ'ŽǀĞƌŶŵĞŶƚůŽƐƚŝƚƐŵĂũŽƌŝƚǇŝŶĞĐĞŵďĞƌ  ? ? ? ? ?/ƚǁĂƐƚŚĞƌĞĨŽƌĞĂŵŝŶŽƌŝƚǇŐŽǀĞƌŶŵĞŶƚĨŽƌ ?ŵŽŶths of 
the 61-month parliament, i.e. 8.2% 
 
 
Parliament 
Bargaining with the 
government 
(supporting parties) 
Bargaining with the 
government 
(opposition parties) 
Legislative committee 
structure  
(opposition parties) 
1945-50 - 0.1 0.05 
1950-51 - 0.1 0.05 
1951-55 - 0.1 0.05 
1955-59 - 0.1 0.05 
1959-64 - 0.1 0.05 
1964-66 - 0.1 0.05 
1966-70 - 0.1 0.05 
1970-74 - 0.1 0.05 
1974 (F) - 0.1 0.05 
1974 (O)-79* 0.75 (33.3%) 
0.2 (33.3%) 
0.5 (66.6%) 
0.05 
1979-83 - 0.1 0.15 
1983-87 - 0.1 0.15 
1987-92 - 0.1 0.15 
1992-97** - 
0.1 (91.8%) 
0.5 (8.2%) 
0.15 
1997-2001 - 0.1 0.15 
2001-05 - 0.1 0.20 
2005-10 - 0.1 0.20 
2010-15 - 0.1 0.25 
2015-20 - 0.1 0.25 
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Table 4: Effective representation at Westminster, 1945-2015 
1. The lower of the percentage of votes or seats won by each opposition party (see Powell, 2000, p. 110). 
 
 
Parliament 
Voters who voted 
for parties now in 
government (%) 
Voters who voted for 
parties supporting 
government (%) 
Voters who voted for parties now in opposition 
Total conditions for effective 
representation 
Opposition 
representation
1
 
 
X 
Probable 
influence 
 
= 
Opposition 
Effective 
Representation 
1945-50 47.7 - (38.5 X 0.150) = 5.8 53.5 
1950-51 46.1 - (43.9 X 0.150) = 6.6 52.7 
1951-55 44.3 - (51.9 X 0.150) = 7.8 51.1 
1955-59 49.7 - (45.3 X 0.150) = 6.8 56.6 
1959-64 49.4 - (42.1 X 0.150) = 6.3 55.7 
1964-66 44.1 - (44.8 X 0.150) = 6.7 50.8 
1966-70 48.0 - (42.2 X 0.150) = 6.3 54.3 
1970-74 46.4 - (44.9 X 0.150) = 6.7 53.1 
1974 (F) 37.2 - (42.5 X 0.150) = 6.4 43.6 
1974 (O) -79* 39.2 
 
(18.3 x 0.75 x 33.3%) = 6.3 
(40.9 
 
(22.6 
X 
AND 
X 
0.55 X 66.6%) 
 
0.25 X 33.3%) 
 
= 
 
16.9 
 
62.4 
1979-83 43.9 - (40.6 X 0.250) = 10.2 54.1 
1983-87 42.4 - (34.4 X 0.250) = 8.6 51.0 
1987-92 42.2 - (37.2 X 0.250) = 9.3 51.1 
1992-97** 41.9 
- (40.2 
 
(40.2 
X 
AND 
X 
0.25 x 91.8%) 
 
0.55 X 8.2%) 
 
= 
 
 
11.0 
 
52.9 
1997-2001 43.2 - (35.5 X 0.250) = 8.9 52.1 
2001-05 40.7 - (37.4 X 0.300) = 11.2 51.9 
2005-10 35.2 - (44.5 X 0.300) = 13.4 48.6 
2010-15 59.1 - (32.5 X 0.350) = 11.4 70.5 
2015-20 36.9 - (39.3 X 0.350) = 13.8 50.7 
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